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Ann: Perspectivalism and Blaming

PERSPECTIVALISM
AND BLAMING
BY DANA ANN

ABSTRACT
Using the combination of two views of blame from T. M. Scanlon and J.
J. C. Smart, I will support my thesis perspectivalism, that blame from the
perspective of a third party is fundamentally different than blame from

the perspective of an injured party. By presenting examples that illustrate
common beliefs concerning hypocrites and cases involving moral luck, I

will give reasons as to why perspectivalism has strong explanatory value, and

also provide motivation for considering blame as a complex topic requiring
a pluralist theory. In doing this, I will show that two statements about

hypocrites are true if we accept perspectivalism. First, as many philosophers
have noted, hypocrites lose their standing to blame from a third party

perspective. Second, with my new understanding of blaming as the injured
party, I will conclude that hypocrites retain their standing to blame in the
injured perspective in virtue of their relationship to the wrong doing. In
the case of the moral luck examples, I will illustrate the complexity that

comes from having two types of blame. Ultimately, I will argue that a correct
general theory of blame must consider the position of the blamer relative

to an instance of wrongdoing, using the explanatory value of the hypocrite
cases, without taking a stand on a specific theory of blame.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a grocery store owner watching in surprise and shock
as a thief steals a can of soup and exits the store. It seems right

to say that the owner has both the epistemic justification for

their belief that they have been wronged, and also the moral
standing to blame the thief for that wrong.

Now imagine a second scenario, in which an individual is

Perspectivalism
That blame from the perspective of a third
party is fundamentally different than blame
from the perspective of an injured party.

In spite of the intuitiveness of this

walking down the street and is carelessly knocked to the ground.

response, in this paper I will argue that

with the person who knocked them down. Again, it seems right

interpret the moral standing of the

To that individual’s surprise, their bag has gone missing, along

to say that the individual on the street has both the epistemic
justification for their belief that they have been wronged, and
the moral standing to blame the thief for wronging them.

But what if I told you that the thief from the first

scenario is the victim in the second? Assuming that they had

no permissible excuse for their actions in the initial instance,
would it not seem absurd for them to feel anger about being

a victim of theft when they were, just the other day, stealing
from the grocery store? By becoming upset when their bag was

stolen, the thief in the original scenario fits the description of

a “garden-variety hypocrite,” an individual who “unrepentantly
engages in the very activity they’re blaming others for” (Coates

2016, 19). We tend to respond to these types of blamers

with the comments like “Look who’s talking,” because of the
perceived inconsistency that exists between their actions and

the common views on hypocrisy correctly
hypocrite as a third party blamer, but fail

to recognize the key difference between

blaming from a third party perspective

and blaming from the perspective of
an injured party. I will argue that there
is a morally relevant feature of being a

member of an injured party that allows
the standing of even a hypocritical victim

to remain intact; that where an individual

is placed relative to an instance of
wrongdoing makes a difference to

whether their own faults are relevant to
their standing to blame. I shall refer to
this view as perspectivalism.

expressed blame.

1. OUR TWO TYPES
OF BLAME

This claim against the hypocrite’s standing to blame is a

The topic of this paper hinges on the

see Dworkin 2000, Cohen 2012, Wallace 2011.

of a person who is not directly—or

common view shared by many philosophers; for more examples,

claim that blame from the perspective
is indirectly—harmed in the given

circumstances, or third party blamer,
differs crucially from blame that comes
from the perspective of a person who has

been directly wronged, known as injured

party blamer. The motivation for this

https://cedar.wwu.edu/orwwu/vol6/iss1/5
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thesis came from conflicting intuitions

someone is to place a negative evaluation on that person’s action.

posit correct theories of blame. For the

implies the individual has a moral responsibility for their action.

that T.M Scanlon and J. J. C. Smart both

purpose of my conclusion, I will illustrate

But unlike the grading of art, the latter type of evaluation

how they can be combined to support the

For Scanlon,

in favor of either of Smart’s or Scanlon’s

is to claim that that action shows something about the

theory of perspectivalism. I do not argue
views; for the sake of this paper I will

assume they are correct, as my goal is to

show that, for the case of the hypocrite,
perspectivalism has both consistency and

explanatory power, and shows complexity
in the cases involving moral luck.

First, Smart’s cognitive theory

...to claim that a person is blameworthy for an action
agent’s attitudes toward others that impairs the relations that others can have with him or her. To blame a

person is to judge him or her to be blameworthy and

to take your relationship with him or her to be modified in a way that this judgment of impaired relations
holds to be appropriate. (Scanlon 2008, 125)

of blame boils down to placing, not

Smart argues that blame is a dispassionate and clearheaded

that the performer of some action has

not praise or blame in this dispassionate way. Utilizing Scanlon’s

necessarily emotionally, an evaluation

done something morally wrong in
performing said action, and implies

they’re responsible for the action. This
is not to say that emotions do not

accompany third party blame, but rather

that this type of blame is sufficient in and
of itself, without considering emotional
aspects. Similar to how an art piece is

graded as being good or bad, to blame

response to action, but he acknowledges that most people do

view of blame, we can find motivations as to why it’s not usual

to blame dispassionately. As Scanlon suggests, relationships are
‘‘constituted by certain attitudes and dispositions’’ among which
‘‘intentions and expectations about how the parties will act

toward one another’’ are most important (Scanlon 2008, 131).
To impair the relationship is to damage the expectations of how
each party will interact with each other. To blame, then, is to
register that damage has been done to the relationship and the
subsequent need for modification.

Now, here we see that Scanlon’s objection to Smart’s

understanding of blame is that the latter failed to recognize the
sense of force behind blame, or the specific damage done to
the injured party, which comes from the issue of treating all
blame as being identical. However, if we take perspectivalism
to be true, there is no need to require that third party blaming

have the same sense of force as does injured party blaming.
This means we could grant that third party blaming is, at a

minimum, a dispassionate evaluation of wrongdoing that
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implies responsibility, while acknowledging that direct harm

the expectation of the relationship. This

takes into account Scanlon’s concept of the force of blame.

returned the missing items, the inmates

done to an injured party allows for reactionary blame, which

Going forward, I will rely on Smart’s theory to represent

third party blame, and Scanlon’s view to represent injured party

blame, which will demonstrate the consistency and explanatory

would account for why, had the guards
would most likely not respond with
abandoning their blame.

Now, imagine this same inmate is

power that perspectivalism has in the case of the hypocrite.

not the injured party, but rather a third

2. HYPOCRITICAL BLAME

stance, the guards could respond to their

Imagine the thief who stole the can of soup is later arrested

for stealing jewels from a jewelry store, and is sent to prison.
Once there, the thief finds that a few personal items are missing.
After investigating, the thief comes to the epistemically sound
and justified conclusion that the guards have been stealing the

items. Enraged by this conclusion, the thief blames the guards
for committing this wrong.

The value of this example lies in its ability to illustrate

how the victim may appropriately blame the guards, in spite
of having unrepentantly engaged in precisely the same sorts

party blamer. It seems that in this circumblame with the comment “Look who’s
talking.” Here, such a response is sufficient

to highlight the inmate’s loss of the moral
standing to blame. Since the inmate

has no other areas they can criticize,
and given that they have not person-

ally suffered harm to any relationship,
the inmate’s blame now seems to be
inappropriate.

Of course, there are circumstances

of behavior they now blame the guards for. And even though

wherein the injured party could involve

stealing from other inmates, since that thief has committed a

tim. Another inmate, who is emotionally

the thief would lose the standing to blame the guards for
similar act before and is likely to reoffend, they still have the
standing to react specifically to the wrongs of which they are the
injured party.

Scanlon’s view would acknowledge that guards owe

inmates specific types of interactions, and that these obligations
are grounded in the expectations that guards and inmates may

reasonably have of each other, in virtue of the nature of their

relationship in the moral community. By stealing from this
individual, the guards have modified the relationship between

the two parties in a negative way and have thereby impaired

more individuals than just the direct vic-

close to the party by virtue of their
intimate relationship, has cause to be a

part of the injured party. Moreover, when
the warden finds out about the actions
of the prison guards, their blame could

be considered as that of an injured party,
given the expectations regarding the

relationship between the warden and
the guards.

In comparison, everyone watching

the original relationship. The inmate’s response of blaming is

the news of the prison guards being

but also a reactionary response to the guards’ failure to fulfill

the inmate, would be blaming from a

not simply an acknowledgement of the guards’ wrongdoing,

https://cedar.wwu.edu/orwwu/vol6/iss1/5
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third party perspective. Since they are

best to follow all driving restrictions. On this occasion, even as

the inmate, their blame would simply be

child runs out into the street, and the driver is unable to stop

not family members of the guards or of
acknowledging the fault in the guard’s
actions, and implying that the guards

are responsible for those wrongdoings.
It seems that perspectivalism, using the

respective theories of Scanlon and Smart,
supports the existence of these two distinct

the driver is paying close attention to their surroundings, a small
in time to avoid a collision. Society and the moral community
will write this off as an unavoidable accident and hold no one at

fault; but what about the child’s parents? Can these individuals
still blame the driver for the loss of their child, when the moral
community finds the driver to be unblameworthy?

My thesis of blame, which combines specifically the

functions of blame.

views of Scanlon and Smart, would allow for the parents of

3. ADDITIONAL COMPLEXITIES
CONCERNING MORAL LUCK

under these exact circumstances. It is true that the driver is not

Imagine now that, on one unfortunate

subsequent harm to that child, but the parents are still left with

night, a morally conscious person is
driving down a residential street. This

individual is a good driver, who takes into

account the safety of others and does their

Moral Community
In this paper, “moral community” is used to
reference how a hypothetical community,
bound by an identical moral theory of right
action, would evaluate specific events. It is
not required, within this essay, to confirm the
exact theory of right action, as it relies on
basic responses given in the domain of
moral responsibility.
Unblameworthy
An evaluation that a moral individual is not
responsible or fitting of blame for a given
event or act. This paper pushes against the
claim that an unblameworthy agent by the
moral community is identically unblameworthy
by the injured party.
Moral Luck
Area within ethics, which studies the
influence of factors that are out of an
agent’s control in relation to whether that
agent can be an object of moral judgement
specific to a variety of different categories
(actions, character disposition, casual events,
circumstantial events, etc.).

Published 44
by Western
CEDAR,
| OCCAM’S
RAZOR2017

the deceased child to—in fact—appropriately blame the driver
responsible for the child running into the street, nor for the

a loss. Even though the driver did not mean for this horrible

event to happen, that individual is still the direct cause of the

child’s death. This is a strong example for many reasons. First,
it is honest about the ways in which our society operates, and
it has explanatory power; sadly, there are parents who have
experienced such tragic events, and there are also people that

are involved in such tragic accidents despite being safe drivers.
Second, I have the internal motivation to protect the driver from

the blame of the parents because I could easily find myself in a

similar position. On the other hand, I could just as easily be in
the position of the parents, who have lost a loved one. Because
both motivations are present, this serves as an intuitive example

for the distinction between the blame from the perspective of
an injured party versus that of a third party, and gives more
reason to believe the two kinds of blame are fundamentally
different. Speaking from the third party perspective and as a

member of the moral community, I would say that the driver
is not responsible for the death of the child because the event
was out of their control, and there are no actions of the driver

to be criticized; the tragic outcome is merely the result of moral
luck. However, if I was speaking from the perspective of the

injured party, I would need to acknowledge the loss, and the
resulting modification to the relationship of the members. It

5

is a reactionary expression from the perspective

of the parents, but this example as whole, shows

the complexity of both perspectives. Although
the consequences that result from cases that are
influenced by moral luck are controversial, and so
my point can be similarly seen as controversial, it

is worthwhile to consider the complexity of two
different perspectives of blame.

4. CONCLUSION
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It seems that our intuitions about blame support the
conclusion that some people have greater claims to

blaming than others; perhaps this a result of injured

party blamers blaming in this very distinct way,
specifically in cases concerning where the hypocrite

has the standing to blame as the injured party. Smart
and Scanlon both offer insight into distinct modes

of blame. Of course, other theories of blame may not
fit so perfectly with the theory of perspectivalism as
those offered by Smart and Scanlon, being that one

is a cognitive theory of blame and the other conative.
For example, it is not clear to me that emotional

theories of blame could accurately fit into this
framework. Putting this concern aside, my hope is

that, even if one rejects Scanlon’s and/or Smart’s view,
the reader will still be left with motivation to see that
there are different types of blame. It is intuitive that
victims of events have a different experience than
bystanders, whose perspective is that of the third

party. Should it not be the case that their reactionary

blame would also be different? Ultimately, the ways
in which I’ve examined both the hypocrite cases and

the cases involving moral luck provide motivations
to question how philosophy of blame has somehow
avoided studying pluralistic theories thus far.
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